Selected reading: Institutions, enforcement and commons-governance arguments.
Cambridge University Press, 2015 edition; ISBN 9781107569782; originally published 1990
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Why do some societies prosper?
Choose one case and map participants, boundaries, monitoring and sanctions.
Under what conditions can a shared resource be governed collectively?
Research on how people organise shared resources. Compare actual rules, monitoring and conflict resolution rather than assuming a single governance solution.
Under what conditions can a shared resource be governed collectively?
Research on how people organise shared resources. Compare actual rules, monitoring and conflict resolution rather than assuming a single governance solution.
Ideas and questions
Read background definitions when a term blocks the argument. Then return to the source and reconstruct its claim in your own words.
Read alongside, read against
Institutions as the Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth
Acemoglu, Johnson · Robinson. Compare assumptions, evidence and scope with the source above. These are editorial companions, not necessarily direct responses.
The Rise and Decline of Nations
Mancur Olson. Compare assumptions, evidence and scope with the source above. These are editorial companions, not necessarily direct responses.
The Logic of Collective Action
Mancur Olson. Compare assumptions, evidence and scope with the source above. These are editorial companions, not necessarily direct responses.
The Mystery of Capital
Hernando de Soto. Compare assumptions, evidence and scope with the source above. These are editorial companions, not necessarily direct responses.
Poor Economics
Abhijit Banerjee · Esther Duflo. Compare assumptions, evidence and scope with the source above. These are editorial companions, not necessarily direct responses.